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IntroductionIn small-sample studies, statisticians often rely on parametric 
assumptions to gain efficiency for estimation and testing. In a Bayesian framework, prior assumptions are also incorporat-
ed into the model. Statistical inference regarding parameters 
of scientific interest is based on the resulting posterior distri-
bution which is obtained by updating the prior assumption 
with observed data. While large sample sizes are preferred for statistical precision, there are many situations when we need 
to make a decision or a series of decisions based on a small 
amount of empirical evidence together with a prior. In this 
case, an investigator’s prior opinion can be highly influential, 
yet it is still essential.
When eliciting prior assumptions, opinions from multiple 
subject area experts are generally more informative than the 
opinion of a single expert. On the other hand, when multiple 
experts have divergent prior opinions, we face the dilemma 
of how each prior opinion should be incorporated into infer-
ential procedures. This decision is important particularly in 
sparse data settings where inference may change substantially 
depending upon the way each prior is incorporated into pos-
terior inference. A combination of multiple sources of infor-
mation has been practiced, and it has been known that sim-
ple combination methods perform reasonably well relative to 
more complicated approaches [1]. One simple method to com-
bine multiple prior opinions is a consensus prior, as discussed 
by Samaniego among others [2]. Samaniego focused on a class 
of estimators which combine individual posterior estimation. 
When each individual has a unique posterior estimate origi-
nated from a unique prior distribution, the class of estimators 
average the multiple posterior estimates based on the credibil-
ity of each prior elicitation determined before observing data. 
This approach seems more robust than relying on a single pos-
terior estimate.
When we have multiple candidate models, accounting for mod-
el uncertainty has been widely discussed in the literature, and 
the idea of model averaging has been popular in dose-response 
modeling in small sample studies [3-7]. It is a robust approach 
which allows multiple models to have a simultaneous contri-
bution to inference, where the weight of contribution is deter-
mined by observed data. In addition to model uncertainty, we 
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Abstract
We occasionally need to make a decision or a series of decisions based on a small sample. In some cases, an investigator is 
knowledgeable about a parameter of interest in some degrees or is accessible to various sources of prior information. Yet, two or 
more experts cannot have an identical prior distribution for the parameter. In this manuscript, we discuss the use of a consensus 
prior and compare two classes of Bayes estimators. In the first class of Bayes estimators, the contribution of each prior opinion 
is determined by observing data. In the second class, the contribution of each prior opinion is determined after observing data. 
Bayesian designs for Phase I clinical trials allocate trial participants at new experimental doses based on accumulated informa-
tion, while the typical sample sizes are fairly small. Using simulations, we illustrate the usefulness of a combined estimate in the 
early phase clinical trials. 
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sometimes face divergent prior beliefs among experiments on 
the same parameter of interest [8]. When it is fairly evident 
that one expert’s prior guess is far more plausible relative to 
the other prior opinions that were obtained, it is tempting to 
determine the credibility of each prior based on observed data. 
In this manuscript, we provide an alternative perspective of 
a consensus prior and the resulting inference obtained from 
the use of a consensus prior. Specifically, we show that a nat-
ural posterior weighting scheme with weights based upon ob-
served data arising naturally in the case of a consensus prior.
This manuscript is organized as follow. In Section 2, we brief-
ly review a consensus prior and the notion of self-consistency 
in the context of Bayesian estimation [2]. We then provide an 
alternative perspective of a consensus prior with a Bayes esti-
mator in which the contribution of each investigator is deter-
mined after observing data. We also comment on Occam’s win-
dow criterion in the context of a consensus prior. In Section 3, 
we provide two examples. The first example is a normal model 
to enhance the understanding of the alternative perspective of 
a consensus prior. The second example is a logistic model ap-
plied to early phase clinical trials. In this type of application, 
experimentalists are generally required to make a series of de-
cisions for trial patients based on sparse data together with all 
available prior information. In Section 4, we present the simu-lation results, and we conclude with a discussion on the utility 
of consensus priors in scientific investigations in Section 5.
Bayesian Decisions Based on a Consensus Prior
A Consensus PriorIn small-sample studies, a single prior opinion that is contrary 
to observed data may substantially influence posterior infer-
ence. To guard against this undesirable situation, we may rely 
on multiple opinions. In this setting, it is necessary to incorpo-
rate prior disagreements in the resulting inferential procedure.
We initially focus on a case when all investigators specify 
conjugate priors through the same model (i.e. the same like-
lihood function). Let Q={Q1,…,QK} denote a set of priors and 
ɡk (θ | Qk ) denote the prior density function of θ from Qk (i.e. 
prior specification by the kth investigator). As discussed by Sa-
maniego, one possible approach for a compromise is to gather 
the multiple investigators and formulate a single prior through 
conversations. This process may not be systematic and is logis-
tically infeasible in many practical settings. One simple alter-
native and systematic approach to account for multiple priors 
is to specify a K-fold mixture
                                                                                                   (2.1)which is referred to as a consensus prior. The assigned prior 
probabilities P(Qk ) for Qk∈Q reflect the plausibility of each 
investigator’s prior opinion, perhaps depending on various 
degrees of knowledge and experience. Multiple advantages 
stemming from the use of a consensus prior based on individ-
ual conjugate priors are listed by Samaniego [2]. In this manu-
script, one particular advantage of interest is that the posterior 
distribution is also a K-fold mixture of gk (θ |    ,Qk ) by conjuga-
cy, where    denotes observed data. Its mathematical property 
will be further discussed in a later section (see Section 2.3).
Self-Consistency
We let    denote a fixed sufficient and unbiased estima-
tor of a scalar parameter θ. The Bayes estimator of θ which 
minimizes square error loss is said to be self-consistent if 
E(θ|   = θ*)=θ*, where θ*=E(θ) is the prior expectation [2]. If 
such an estimator exists, the property of self-consistency is ap-pealing in the sense that the posterior estimate is θ* when both 
a prior estimate and an unbiased estimator are θ*. Under an ex-
ponential family, we may find a self-consistent estimator of the 
form (1-η) θ*+ηθ̂. However, self-consistency is not guaranteed in many cases, particularly when the estimand of interest is a 
nonlinear function of regression parameters.
Using the form of a consensus prior in Equation (2.1), 
Samaniego noted that self-consistency is not preserved in gen-
eral. He instead discussed the class of estimators of the form
                                                                                                              (2.2)
where an individual posterior estimator θ̂k is of the form 
(1-ηk)θk*+ηkθ̂. Here θk*=E(θ|Qk) is an individual pri-or mean and ak does not depend on data. This class of estimators is a natural compromise among disagreeing 
posterior estimates, where the contribution of each inves-
tigator is determined by the prior plausibility, say ak=P(Qk ).  
If ηk is restricted to be constant (i.e. ηk=η) and 
θ̂=θ*=       the property of self-consistency can be 
preserved because
                     =(1-η) θ*+ηθ*=θ*                                               (2.3)If ηk depends on k, self-consistency is not generally guaranteed.
An Alternative Perspective for a Consensus Prior
While the notion of self-consistency is mathematically appeal-
ing, there are cases when we wish to use empirical evidence 
to determine each individual’s contribution to the posterior 
estimation. For instance, when θ̂1=-1 and θ̂2=1 after observing 
θ̂=2, it may be a natural reaction to desire a2>a1. Any data-de-
pendent weighting scheme initially appears to be foundational 
unsound from a Bayesian perspective since one would seem-
ingly be required to change their prior assumptions following 
the observation of empirical results. While briefly noted by 
Samaniego [2] we show in this section that at least one da-
ta-dependent weighting scheme can be formally justified by 
showing its equivalence to the use of a consensus prior that 
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where ak*=P(Qk|    ) is the posterior weight given in Equation 
(2.5) and θ̂k=E(θ |  , Qk) is the individual Bayes estimator which 
minimizes square error loss with respect to the individual pos-
terior. At first glance, the data-dependent weighting scheme in this estimator may appear incoherent from a Bayesian per-
spective because each posterior weight ak* depends on the 
same data   . However, the proposition supports that it is a 
natural reaction after observing    in a Bayesian framework. 
We also note that self-consistency of θ̂** is not simple to be 
achieved even if θ̂k is of the form (1-η) θk*+ηθ̂. In the following 
section, we compare the characteristics of θ̂* and θ̂**.
Examples and Simulation Studies
A Normal Model
We consider a random sample   =(Y1,…,Yn ), where Yi ~ N(μ,σ2 ) with unknown μ and known σ2. Under this exponential fam-
ily, the sample mean μ̂=Y̅ is sufficient and unbiased for μ. For 
k=1,…,K, the conjugate priors μ | Qk  ~ N(μk*,σk2) leads to the 
posterior μ|  ,Qk ~ N(μ̂k,τk-1), where τk=σk-2+nσ-2 denotes the 
posterior precision (i.e. inverse of the posterior variance) 
and the Bayes estimator μ̂k is in the form of (1-ηk)μk*+ηkY̅ with 
ηk=nσ-2τk-1. For self-consistency, we require the same pri-
or precision τk=τ, and the self-consistent estimator of μ is                                    , where ak=P(Qk ).
Each individual marginal likelihood function can be written as
where vk=σk2+σ2 n-1. To this end, the posterior contribution of Qk to the weighted posterior ɡ2 (μ |   ) is
P(Qk|   )∝P(Qk)  ϕ(y̅; μk*,vk) ,where ϕ(∙) denotes a normal density function.Then, the 
posterior weighted estimator of μ is μ̂**=      , with ak*=P(Qk)ϕ(y̅; μk*,vk ). In practice, some expert may be more 
experienced to receive a relatively greater prior weight P(Qk 
). However, for a given P(Qk), a strong prior opinion expressed 
via a small value of σk2 additionally increases the posterior weight ak*. This is a typical behavior in the posterior weight-
ing scheme through conjugacy. To this end, it is something to 
consider whether we desire to upweight an individual opinion 
simply because of a relatively strong prior opinion.
Typically with a small sample, the bias of μ̂** is small rela-
tive to the bias of μ̂* because μ̂** has the second chance to ad-
just weights based on observed data. On the other hand, the 
variance of μ̂** is large relative to the variance of μ̂* because the data-dependent weight ak* is random from sample to sample. 
As a numerical example for the trade-off between bias and 
variance, we consider K=2 prior opinions with σk=0.5 (i.e. pri-
or sample size of two) and μk*=(-1)k for k=1,2. Figure 1 shows 
the curve of relative root mean square error (RMSE) of μ̂**) to 
μ̂* when μ varies from -2 to 2 for small sample sizes n=3,6,9,12. 
is specified prior to the observation of any experimental data. 
The result not only provides formal justification for the use of 
adaptively weighted priors in sequential experimentation and 
also yields further intuitive appeal for the use of consensus 
priors in Bayesian inference.
Let f(   | θ) be the likelihood function which is common for all 
Qk∈Q. The individual marginal likelihood function 
                                                                                                              (2.4)still, depends on Qk. Given    , we can quantify the updated belief for Qk∈Q by                                                                                                              
                                                                                                               (2.5)
Though maybe sound weird to some readers, it is the posterior 
probability of a prior. Conditioning on a prior, the individual 
posterior probability distribution of θ is
                                                                                                               (2.6)
We claim that the weighted average of the individual posterior 
probability density function 
                                                                                                               (2.7)
is legitimate. Furthermore, it is equivalent to
                                                                                                                                         (2.8)where g*(θ) is the consensus prior in Equation (2.1).
Theorem. For a given set of priors Q={Q1,…,QK } and with prior density functions gk(θ |Qk ) for k=1,…,K, we have g1(θ |    )=g2 
(θ |   ).
Proof. By Equations (2.1) to (2.7),
Therefore, the posterior inference initialized by a consensus 
prior and the posterior inference based on the weighted poste-
rior density function are equivalent. In addition, the posterior 
contribution of the kth investigator is exactly equal to P(Qk |   ) 
in Equation (2.5). This procedure is very similar to the proce-
dure of Bayesian model averaging which allows multiple likeli-
hoods to account for model uncertainty [3].
Relative to the consensus posterior g
2
 (θ |   ), the Bayes estima-tor of θ which minimizes square error loss is
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Focusing on the case of P(Q1 )=P(Q2), RMSE exceeds one (i.e. 
the self-consistent μ̂* performs better) when μ is close to the 
midpoint of the two prior estimates. On the other hand, RMSE 
is below one (i.e. the posterior weighted μ̂** performs better) 
when μ is substantially closer to one of the two prior estimates. 
The relative performance of μ̂** is more plausible as n increas-
es. Focusing on the case of P(Q
2
)=9×P(Q1), a similar trend is 
shown with the zone of superiority of  μ̂* shifted the the toward 
μ
2
*=1. When μ is near μ
2
*, the posterior weighted μ̂** performs 
better with respect to RMSE. When μ is against the prior as-
signment P(Q
2
)=9×P(Q1) (i.e. μ is close to μ1*), RMSE decreases, 
and the rate of a decrease is faster with a larger sample size. 
When σ2 is unknown, the relative operating characteristics of 
μ̂** to μ̂* is similar to when σ2 is known.
 
Figure 1. RMSE of  μ̂** to μ̂* when μ varies from -2 to 2 for n=3,6,9,12. 
The figure on the left is the case of P(Q1 )=P(Q2 ), and the figure on the 
right is the case of P(Q
2
 )=9×P(Q1 ).
A Logistic Regression Model in Phase I Clinical Trials
Background: Phase I Clinical Trials
A maximum tolerable dose (MTD) is the highest dose of a ther-
apeutic treatment that does not cause unacceptable toxicity 
in a loose definition. A precise definition will be provided lat-
er in this section. A primary objective of most Phase I clinical 
trials is to study the toxicity of a new drug and to determine 
the MTD for later investigation and future patients. Whitehead 
and Williamson discussed various Bayesian decision theoretic 
approaches for dose-finding studies based on a logistic regres-
sion model [9] in addition to the design which focused on in-
formation gain [10]. Among various gain functions discussed, we focus on the patient gain using the terminology in the paper 
of Whitehead and Williamson. For the patient gain, the dose 
allocation rule is optimal for each member of trial participants. 
This experimental design is analogous to the continual reas-
sessment method (CRM) proposed by O’Quigley et al. which 
was first developed to treat cancer patients in severe condi-
tions [11]. One major concern about this Bayesian adaptive 
design is prior sensitivity. In particular, estimation of the MTD 
and the number of adverse events (AEs) per trial are highly 
sensitive to a prior specification because we often have thirty 
or less subjects in Phase I clinical trials. Sometimes, multiple 
researchers may have different opinions about the toxicity of 
a new experimental drug, and the dose allocations for the first 
few trial participants heavily depend on their subjective opin-
ions. Therefore, the application of a consensus prior is suitable.
Suppose we observe     =(Y1,…,Yn ), where Yi  ~ Bernoul-
li(  )  with Yi=1 indicating an AE at the treated dose xi in log-
scale. Using a logistic regression, the likelihood function of 
    = (β0,β1 ) is
by assuming independence among patients. We let β0∈(-∞,∞) 
and β1∈(0,∞) by assuming a monotonic dose-response re-
lationship. We consider a conditional mean prior [12]. This 
method of prior elicitation requires the selection of two arbi-
trarily doses, say x-1<x0 without loss of generosity. Then, we 
specify two independent Beta priors     ~ Beta(pi,qi ) for i=-1,0. 
By the Jacobian transformation, we obtain the joint prior den-sity function
 hence pi and qi can be thought of as the pseudo numbers of AEs 
and non-AEs, respectively, at the selected dose xi. To this end, 
we achieve the conjugacy by the posterior density function
where yi=pi and 1-yi=qi for i=-1,0.
If we have multiple prior opinions, Q={Q1,…,QK}, we may ask each kth investigator independently to specify (xik,pik,qik) for 
i=-1,0. In addition to the conjugacy, the conditional mean prior 
is advantageous because it is more interpretable than a direct 
specification of the joint prior density function of     . Hence, it is easy to control the amount of prior information in a con-
sensus prior. By the conjugacy, the weighted posterior density 
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function is
where yik=yi, nik=1 and cik=1 for i=1,…,n and yik=pik, nik=pik+qik and
for i=-1,0. It may be plausible to keep x0k-x-1k constant or nearly 
constant across investigators because the distance contributes 
to the weighted posterior. In addition, the values of (pik,qik) 
are highly influential when they are not small. For exam-
ple, if (pi1,qi1)=(1,2) and (pi2,qi2)=(2,4) with the same value of 
x0k-x-1k, then ci2/ci1=10.
Here we provide the precise definition of the MTD. For a given 
risk level γ∈(0,1), we define MTD as
                                                                                                               (3.1)
under the logistic model. We simplify the notation D
γ
(    ) by D
γ
. 
Equivalently, it is the dose such that             under the model. As-
suming both efficacy and toxicity of a treatment is monotonic 
with respect to dose, D
γ
 is the target treatment dose for a fixed 
risk level, and it is the parameter of interest. A typical value of 
γ is between 0.15 and 0.35 in a cancer study. 
Allocating Trial Participants to New Experimental Doses
We modify the patient gain discussed in Whitehead and Wil-
liamson [9] to the patient loss by taking the inverse of the gain. 
For the patient loss, we allocate the (n+1)th patient at  where the kth posterior mean contributes to this decision with the data-dependent weight of ak*=P(Qk|   ). From the perspec-
tive of the Bayesian decision theoretic approach, each patient is allocated at the posterior weighted estimator 
Due to a finite sample and the nonlinear transformation of the 
regression parameters, it is difficult to construct a self-consis-
tent estimator. In particular, it is difficult to link the class of estimators
With the data-independent weight ak=P(Qk) to self-consistency.
Simulation
Simulation Designs
We design simulation studies to investigate the relative op-
erating characteristics of the two consensus estimators D̂
γ
* 
and D̂
γ
** in Phase I clinical trials. For numerical experiments, 
we set the target risk level at γ=0.2 and assume N=25 pa-
tients are available for a Phase I clinical trial. We suppose 
three investigators have divergent prior opinions. The first 
investigator specifies Q1 with (x-11, p-11, q-11)=(-4.0,1.2,3.8) and 
(x01,p01,q01 )=(4.0,3.8,1.2). The prior specification added 1.2 
AEs and 3.8 non-AEs at the arbitrarily low dose x-11=-4 (in log-
scale) and added 3.8 AEs and 1.2 non-AEs at the arbitrarily 
high dose x01=4 (in log-scale as well). The second investiga-
tor specifies Q2 by (x-11, p-11, q-11)=(0.0,1.2,3.8) and (x01,p01,q01 
)=(8.0,3.8,1.2), and the third investigator specifies Q3 by 
(x
-12
,p
-12
,q
-12
)=(4.0,1.2,3.8) and (x
02
,p
02
,q
02
)=(12.0,3.8,1.2). 
The three prior elicitations are designed to be equal-
ly strong by making  x0k- x-1k=9 and                . In addition, 
we assume the equal prior probability P(Qk )=1/3 for k=1,2,3. 
The prior mean of D
γ
 is D
γ,k
*=E(D
γ
|Qk)=-3.1,0.9,4.9 for k=1,2,3, 
respectively, so Q1 is relatively conservative and Q3 is relatively 
anti-conservative. If a trial is proceeded by each investigator 
separately, the first trial patient is allocated at the three indi-
vidual prior estimates. The remaining trial patients are allo-cated at the updated estimates of D
γ
, therefore the three priors shall lead to different results at the end of trial with respect 
to the final estimation of D
γ
 and the total number of observed 
AEs, denoted by           . On the other hand, if the three in-
vestigators make a compromise through a consensus prior, 
the first patient is allocated at (-3.1+0.9+4.9)  / 3=0.9 and the 
remaining decisions are based on the consensus estimators. 
If D̂
γ
* is used, the three investigators contribute the entire trial 
equally. If D̂
γ
** is used, the contribution of each investigator var-
ies depending on accumulated data.
As shown in Figure 2, we consider the nine scenarios by cross-
ing the three values of the intercept β0=(-6,-3,0) and the three 
values of the slope β1=(0.5,0.8,1.2) under the logistic model. 
The indexing number of each scenario is attached in the as-
cending order of D
γ
. From Scenarios 1 to 9, the nine values of 
D
γ
 are -2.77, -1.73, -1.16, 1.34, 2.02, 3.23, 3.84, 5.77 and 9.23. 
A low value of D
γ
 implies that a new experimental treatment is 
safe, and a high value of D
γ
 implies that it is fairly toxic. In each 
subfigure, the true value of D
γ
 in each scenario is indicated by 
the dotted line, and prior guesses D
γ,k
* for k=1,2,3 are indicated 
by the three solid lines.
Evaluations
We let D̂
γ
 generically denote a Bayes decision for D
γ
. Then, the 
distribution of interest is         rather than the distribution of 
D̂
γ
 itself. In other words, if D̂
γ
 deviates from D
γ
, practitioners’ 
interest is the deviation of       from the target risk level γ. 
We evaluate simulation results in three respects. First, it is 
important to treat trial participants near the target risk level 
γ=0.2 (from the perspective of current patients). In this regard, 
we measure the mean, standard deviation (SD) and root mean 
square error (RMSE) of πX with respect to 0.2, where X is the 
random variable denoting a treated dose in a trial. Second, it is 
also important to have          near γ=0.2 at the end of a trial (from 
the perspective of future patients). In this regard, we measure 
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the mean, SD and RMSE of       after observing the outcomes of 
N=25 patients. Third, practitioners concern about the distri-
bution of                  , the sum of AEs at the end of a trial. In par-
ticular, as we fixed N=25 and γ=0.2, a desirable distribution of 
S25 should have a mode near N×γ=5 with small V(S25) and large 
P(4≤S
25
≤6). To this end, we summarize the distribution of S
25
 
by the mean, SD and P(4≤S
25
≤6).
Simulation Results
The simulation results for using individual Q1, Q2, Q3 and the consensus prior consisting of {Q1,Q2,Q3} are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. In the table, the consensus prior with the prior weighted 
scheme (i.e. D̂
γ
*) is denoted by          and the consensus prior 
with the posterior weighted scheme (i.e. D̂
γ
**) is denoted by        .
Focusing on the distribution of πX (see the left three columns of 
the table), the use of a single prior opinion can be very sensi-
tive depending on the true dose-response curve. In Scenario 1, 
2 and 3, when a new experimental dose has relatively high tox-
icity, the respective means of πX were 0.711, 0.787 and 0.860 
for the anti-conservative prior Q3 which imply that large pro-
portion of trial patients were overdosed in trials. By the use 
of a consensus prior, the respective means reduced to 0.428, 
0.393 and 0.363 for        , and they reduced to 0.268, 0.238 and 
0.224 for      , respectively, which were closer to γ=0.2. The 
SDs of π_X were greater in        than in      . The RMSEs were 
lower for         . When the true value of D
γ
 increases from Scenar-
io 4 to Scenario 9,        yielded the averages of πX closer to γ=0.2 
with larger SDs when compared to        . As a consequence, the 
RMSE of πX was greater in        than in        .
Focusing on the distribution of      (see the middle three 
columns of the table), similar trends were found for Q1, Q
2
, Q3,       and      with respect to the mean, SD and RMSE. In each  scenario,         in         was closer to the target γ=0.2 on 
average with larger variability when compared to   . 
The resulting RMSEs of   were smaller in Scenar-
ios 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9, the cases when the combined 
prior opinions were relatively distant from the true 
value of D
γ
. The gross negative impact of prior misspecification 
was reduced by weighting each prior opinion based on data. 
 
When the combined prior opinions were relatively close to the 
truth as in Scenarios 4, 5, 6 and 7, the RMSEs of        were 
smaller due to less variability of D
γ
* than the variability of 
D̂
γ
**. This general tendency was similar to the case under the normal model when we compared the self-consistent estima-
tor μ̂* and the re-weighted estimator μ̂**.
We turn our focus to the distribution of S25 (see the right three 
columns of the table). The resulting E(S25) generally decreased as the true D
γ
 increased for each method of Bayes estima-
tion with rare exceptions. In the nine scenarios, the range of 
E(S25) was (0.066, 4.835) for Q1, (0.433, 10.674) for Q2, (2.044, 
17.778) for Q3, (0.436, 10.674) for      and (1.590, 6.686) 
for    . By adaptively weighting each individual’s opinion 
based on accumulated information,            resulted in the short-est range of E(S25) across the various scenarios, and it yield-ed S25 closest to N×γ=5 on average among the five considered 
approaches. Furthermore, the posterior adaptive weighting 
scheme provided robustness to P(4≤S25≤6).
In summary, the resulting distributions of πX  ,       and S25 from 
the individual priors Q1, Q2 and Q3 showed high prior sensitiv-
ity, and robustness was gained by the use of a consensus prior. 
When we compared the prior weighting scheme       and the 
posterior weighting scheme        ,         yielded relatively small 
variability with respect to dose allocation and final estimation 
of D
γ
, and         yielded relatively small deviation from the tar-
get on average. The distribution of S25 was significantly more 
robust for       by adjusting the weights of contributions based 
on updated data. 
Figure 3 graphically summarize the relative performance 
of          to              . The figure on the left shows the relative RMSE of 
πX (solid) and the relative RMSE of       (dotted). A relative RMSE 
lower than one implies a smaller RMSE for        , and the result 
is analogous to Figure 1. When the consensus prior guess and 
the true value of a parameter of interest are fairly close, the 
prior weighting scheme tends to be better with respect to the 
RMSE. When the two quantities are distant (i.e. one extreme 
prior guess is relatively close to the true value), the posterior 
weighting scheme tends to be better with respect to the RMSE. 
In Figure 3, the figure on the right highlights the robustness of 
 
 
Figure 2. Nine simulation scenarios (Scenario 1 to 9) and prior guesses in Q1, Q2 and Q3.
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Scenario 
 
Prior 
     ̂      
Mean SD RMSE Mean SD RMSE Mean SD  (       ) 
 
 
1 
   0.194 0.071 0.071 0.195 0.067 0.067 4.835 1.108 0.831 
   0.363 0.107 0.195 0.282 0.046 0.094 9.077 1.549 0.033 
   0.711 0.075 0.516 0.646 0.006 0.446 17.778 2.039 0.000 
    
  0.428 0.089 0.245 0.365 0.041 0.170 10.674 1.706 0.003 
    
   0.268 0.149 0.163 0.211 0.077 0.077 6.686 1.212 0.450 
 
 
2 
   0.159 0.086 0.095 0.186 0.080 0.081 3.992 0.961 0.688 
   0.316 0.140 0.182 0.228 0.065 0.071 7.891 1.228 0.117 
   0.787 0.077 0.592 0.717 0.006 0.517 19.676 1.882 0.000 
    
  0.393 0.122 0.228 0.318 0.057 0.131 9.856 1.460 0.005 
    
   0.238 0.171 0.175 0.196 0.089 0.089 5.971 1.018 0.714 
 
 
3 
   0.141 0.103 0.119 0.187 0.093 0.094 3.554 0.861 0.510 
   0.279 0.166 0.184 0.197 0.080 0.080 7.021 0.976 0.300 
   0.860 0.064 0.663 0.795 0.004 0.595 21.490 1.637 0.000 
    
  0.363 0.153 0.223 0.283 0.073 0.110 9.072 1.205 0.008 
    
   0.224 0.192 0.193 0.196 0.105 0.105 5.582 0.877 0.861 
 
 
4 
   0.052 0.056 0.159 0.139 0.074 0.096 1.273 0.725 0.002 
   0.186 0.111 0.112 0.192 0.094 0.094 4.652 0.879 0.907 
   0.418 0.190 0.289 0.275 0.052 0.091 10.442 1.409 0.000 
    
  0.200 0.106 0.106 0.201 0.088 0.088 5.032 0.894 0.928 
    
   0.208 0.165 0.166 0.202 0.109 0.109 5.179 0.896 0.916 
 
 
5 
   0.044 0.037 0.160 0.103 0.043 0.106 1.111 0.779 0.002 
   0.167 0.087 0.093 0.187 0.080 0.081 4.185 0.966 0.756 
   0.333 0.144 0.196 0.238 0.060 0.072 8.298 1.278 0.066 
    
  0.174 0.081 0.085 0.191 0.074 0.075 4.350 0.975 0.801 
    
   0.205 0.136 0.136 0.201 0.092 0.092 5.129 1.050 0.861 
 
 
6 
   0.041 0.024 0.161 0.077 0.024 0.125 1.020 0.819 0.003 
   0.134 0.059 0.089 0.167 0.062 0.070 3.362 1.051 0.429 
   0.262 0.087 0.107 0.221 0.064 0.067 6.551 1.248 0.494 
    
  0.137 0.055 0.084 0.165 0.057 0.067 3.413 1.065 0.442 
    
   0.188 0.103 0.103 0.200 0.079 0.079 4.717 1.154 0.797 
 
 
7 
   0.005 0.005 0.196 0.020 0.004 0.180 0.113 0.325 0.000 
   0.107 0.092 0.131 0.180 0.091 0.093 2.676 0.808 0.140 
   0.234 0.137 0.141 0.192 0.089 0.090 5.840 0.893 0.785 
    
  0.103 0.086 0.130 0.168 0.089 0.095 2.584 0.770 0.106 
    
   0.181 0.144 0.145 0.197 0.104 0.104 4.552 0.889 0.883 
 
 
8 
   0.003 0.003 0.197 0.010 0.001 0.190 0.083 0.280 0.000 
   0.051 0.041 0.155 0.113 0.049 0.100 1.263 0.802 0.005 
   0.174 0.088 0.092 0.190 0.082 0.082 4.372 0.985 0.802 
    
  0.049 0.040 0.156 0.108 0.049 0.104 1.221 0.777 0.003 
    
   0.142 0.104 0.119 0.190 0.086 0.087 3.567 0.950 0.508 
 
 
9 
   0.003 0.002 0.197 0.006 0.001 0.194 0.066 0.253 0.000 
   0.018 0.010 0.183 0.037 0.008 0.163 0.436 0.608 0.000 
   0.081 0.042 0.126 0.126 0.046 0.087 2.044 0.966 0.068 
    
  0.018 0.010 0.183 0.036 0.008 0.164 0.433 0.595 0.000 
    
   0.064 0.044 0.143 0.118 0.045 0.094 1.590 0.887 0.018 
 
Table 1. Simulation results in Scenarios 1 to 9.
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the posterior weighting scheme with respect to E(S25 ), and the 
comparison appears to be of practical importance (i.e. safety of 
dose-finding studies). 
DiscussionIn small-sample studies, there are cases when we want our 
prior knowledge to influence a decision in a robust manner. 
In a scientific community it is impossible that two or more re-
searchers have the exactly same prior opinion about a parame-
ter of interest, while gathering various sources of information 
is encouraged. For some scientific topics, experts have various 
and perhaps strong opinions. To this end, a consensus prior 
can be useful in a practical sense. We provided the theoretical 
perspective of a consensus prior and the class of re-weighted Bayes estimators in comparison to the class of Bayes estima-
tors with prior weights.
The prior weights have a path to self-consistency under simple 
models, while the re-weighted Bayes estimators have a diffi-
culty with respect to self-consistency. However, the posterior 
weighting scheme allows to adjust the contribution of each 
investigator’s opinion based on empirical evidence, which is 
a natural reaction given data. Based on our numerical illustra-
tions, the prior weighting method yields smaller variability 
while the posterior weighting method yields smaller bias. If 
the true value of parameter is located near the middle of prior 
guesses, the prior weights seem preferable. In the other case, 
the posterior weights seem preferable. This may be an intui-
tive result because when data cannot clearly determine whose 
prior specification was more plausible, the prior disagreement 
would be more controversial in posterior. On the other hand, 
when data favors one prior specification than the other, the de-
gree of disagreement can be decreased in posterior.
When we formulate a consensus prior, it is important to check 
the balance of prior elicitations. We may not want one person’s 
prior opinion to be upweighted simply because it is dogmatic. 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparing the posterior weighting scheme (i.e. decision based on D̂
γ
** to the prior weight scheme (decision based on D̂
γ
*). 
The figure on the left focuses on the RMSE of        . The figure on the right focuses on E(S25). ̂  
To this end, we may impose some restriction on the magni-
tudes of hyper-parameters. For example, in a Phase I clinical trial with the logistic model, the amount of prior information
can be measured by the total number of pseudo 
observations                     . Unless the strengths of prior elic-
itations are intentionally unbalanced, we may match the hy-
per-parameters or pre-investigate the impact of different hy-
per-parameters under a model specified.
A primary focus of this manuscript has not been to urge one 
Bayes estimator outperforms better than the other Bayes es-
timator based on a single measure of the operating charac-
teristic (e.g. RMSE). A choice of estimator shall depend on the 
context of a problem. For example, in Scenario 7 of Table 1, the 
posterior weighting scheme allocated patients at the risk lev-
el of 0.181 on average with SD of 0.144. On the other hand, 
the prior weighting scheme allocated patients at the risk lev-
el of 0.103 on average with SD of 0.086 which resulted in the 
smaller RMSE (0.145 versus 0130). We may want to carefully 
think about whether precise underdosing throughout a trial or 
slightly less precise dosing near the target is more preferable. 
As such, it would be important to understand the operating 
characteristics of consensus Bayes estimators under a given 
setting. In sparse data with strongly divergent priors, it is pos-
sible to face false minima in optimization, and a smoothed ver-
sion of the estimator can be an alternative approach using sur-
rogate data [13]. Alternatively, when a conservative decision 
is needed in early phase clinical trials, a decision can be made 
with the constraint that the predicted risk does not exceed a 
fixed threshold, such as a fixed quantile of the posterior dis-
tribution [14]. As such, a choice shall depend on the practical 
situation.
∑     
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